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EMINENT DOMAIN-UsE OF TM PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT
DOMAIN CODE OF 1964 To PROVIE INITIAL, COMMON PLEAS JURIS-
DICTION IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF ZONING CASES
Landowner bought thirteen acres of land in Hickory Township in
order to build a supermarket. For three years he has used the land as a
golf driving range. The land, suitable only for business purposes, was
zoned for business until July 1, 1964, when the township rezoned it as
R-2 (residential) in order to keep the business district confined to its
present area. Landowner is trapped: to make his land suitable for resi-
dential use would involve prohibitive cost, and, since the housing built
after such improvement would have to be low-cost, it would not bring
enough profit to cover the expense of necessary improvements. Land-
owner not only has lost his investment, but also must continue to pay taxes
on the land. Landowner faces the prospect of protracted litigation to try
to salvage his property rights.
This hypothetical situation presents an example of a zoning ordinance
which has resulted in a constitutionally-prohibited taking of property with-
out just compensation.' Both the police power, under which the zoning
ordinance was passed, and the power of eminent domain are adjuncts of the
sovereignty of the state.2 The use of both is limited by the due process
clause to actions which are for the health, safety, or general welfare of the
community.3 They are differentiated, however, by the constitutional 4
'This hypothetical fact situation is substantially that found in Garbev Zoning
Case, 385 Pa. 328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956). The court in this instance held the ordi-
nance invalid because it violated the Pennsylvania constitution by taking land without
just compensation. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
2 The citizen whose use of his property is curtailed by an exercise of the police
power can be said to be compensated by his share in the public good that such restric-
tions bring about; the restrictions are thus self-compensating. According to this
view, the constitutional compensation requirement represents a determination by the
framers that the individual's share of the public good justifies only a limited amount
of restriction on his rights. In other words, if property ownership is pictured as a
bundle of sticks (rights), the framers decided that the retention of a certain number
of those sticks is a basic right upon which the government might not encroach without
paying compensation over and above the mutual benefit which the restrictions them-
selves provide.
3 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (eminent domain); Andress v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 77, 188 A2d 709 (1963) (zoning).4 PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("nor shall private property be taken or applied to
public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made
or secured"); PA. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 8:
Municipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege
of taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for
property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of
their works, highways or improvements, which compensation shall be paid or
secured before such taking, injury or destruction.
The United States Supreme Court in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897), stated that the right to just compensation for property taken by state
authority was one of the fundamental liberties included in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
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requirement that just compensation be paid whenever the state "takes"
property,5 i.e., exercises the power of eminent domain. When the state
exercises the police power with the unintended result of "taking" property,
courts have generally voided the offending ordinance. 6 Rarely have courts
reached the equally logical result of simply treating the ordinance as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain and ordering just compensation,
although this result would seem more desirable in many situations such
as the present hypothetical.
7
When government authority has been involved in a physical taking
of land for which no compensation has been paid, the Pennsylvania courts
have sometimes permitted the landowner to bring an inverse condemnation
suit to recover compensation.8 Pennsylvania courts have even allowed
inverse condemnation suits involving only regulatory takings.9 In Sansom
Street (Caplan's Appeal),"' the City of Philadelphia had mapped a widening
of Sansom Street and by ordinance had precluded the owners from de-
veloping the land to be used for this project until the project was actually
undertaken. Caplan had property bordering on Sansom Street which
became unusable because of the restriction. He brought an inverse con-
demnation suit for the appointment of viewers to assess damages. The
trial court held that there had been no taking as defined by the Pennsylvania
constitution because the ordinance did not provide for the actual widening
of the street.' The supreme court reversed, stating that Caplan's land
had been taken within the meaning of the Pennsylvania constitution. The
court said that, in spite of the fact that there had been no physical invasion,
there was no valid reason for distinguishing this case from one of
outright seizure.
The regulatory-taking, inverse condemnation suits differ from the
present situation, however, because the legislature has drawn a statutory
5 See White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 Atl. 409 (1926) (dictum). While the
views stated in this case are not good law today, see Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958), the statement con-
cerning the division between the power of eminent domain and the police power is
still valid. See generally McCrady Case, 399 Pa. 586, 160 A.2d 715 (1960) ; Best v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
6 See, e.g., Garbev Zoning Case, 385 Pa. 328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956) ; Baronoff v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956) ; Miller v. Beaver Falls,
368 Pa. 189, 82 A2d 34 (1951).
7 If this result were reached, the taking authority need not be required to maintain
and pay for the restriction. It might be permitted to revoke the condemnation and
pay damages for the intervening time. See Reinhold v. Commonwealth, 319 Pa. 33,
179 Atl. 571 (1935).
8 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123, rev'd on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 84 (1961). An inverse condemnation suit is one in which a
property owner petitions the court to assess the compensation to which he is entitled
because an entity with the power of eminent domain has taken his land. See generally
Note, 1962 WAsH. U.L.Q. 210, 232-36.
9 In Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra note 8, at 414, 168 A.2d at 124, the court
indicated that it made no distinction between physical and regulatory takings by citing
a zoning case, Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), which involved
only a regulatory taking.
10 293 Pa. 483, 143 Ati. 134 (1928).
IlIn re Widening of Sansom Street, 10 Pa. D. & C. 247 (C.P. Philadelphia
County 1928).
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line which separates zoning from other exercises of the police power. A
landowner aggrieved by a zoning regulation must pursue a statutory appeal
process before the common pleas courts can take jurisdiction.12  Thus, to
gain relief from what he believes is an unconstitutional taking of his
property, Landowner must follow the procedure provided in the zoning
code for second class townships by drawing up building plans or a sub-
division plat and applying for a permit, then, on failure to get such a
permit, appealing to the board of adjustment.13 Various reasons are as-
signed for requiring exhaustion of these statutory remedies. First, the
zoning board might grant relief, thus relieving Landowner from any taking,
so the court should not have to hear the case until this relief is precluded.
Second, trial of the usual zoning appeal in a court would be facilitated by
the record of the proceedings before the board.' 4 Finally, the tradition is
that, since zoning is statutory, the remedy is exclusively one at law, and the
law requires that the statutory procedures be followed.' 5
The board cannot decide whether or not a zoning ordinance constituted
a taking and cannot void the ordinance; " it is restricted to granting
variances. Therefore, landowners in a zoning-taking situation must have
a reasonable possibility of obtaining a variance for the statutory appeal
process to serve them any purpose. In the present hypothetical, the zoning
board would be loath to grant Landowner a variance because of likely
political opposition 17 and because such a large-scale variance might emas-
culate the zoning plan. Moreover, in some cases the emasculation might
be so serious as effectively to void the ordinance, a remedy beyond the
board's power.' 8
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67007 (Supp. 1963).
13 Home Life Ins. Co. of America v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 447, 143
A.2d 21 (1958) (requiring application for permit); Jacobs v. Fefzer, 381 Pa. 262,
112 A.2d 356. (1955) (requiring appeal to board of adjustment). For an example
of the delays which may be caused by this process, see the Easttown Township Zoning
Cases: it re Appeal of Nat'l Land & Inv. Co., Appeal No. 78, Bd. of Adjustment
of Easttown Township, Chester County, Pa., 1963; Natl Land & Inv. Co. Appeal,
32 Pa. D. & C.2d 426 (C.P. Chester County 1963) ; In re Appeal of Nat'l Land &
Inv. Co., No. 21, C.P. Chester County, Pa., Jan. 1963; In re Appeal of Nat'l Land
& Inv. Co., Appeal No. 78, Bd. of Adjustment of Easttown Township, Chester
County, Pa., Jan. 24, 1964; Appeal of Nat'l Land & Inv. Co., 13 Chester 4 (C.P.
Chester County, Pa., 1964).
14 Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study
in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273-78 (1962); see Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
410 Pa. 77, 188 A.2d 709 (1963).
'5 See Barth v. Gorson, 383 Pa. 611, 119 A.2d 309 (1956).
16 See Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62,
141 A.2d 851 (1958). The powers of the board of adjustment are listed in PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 53, § 67007 (Supp. 1963).
V7 Cf. Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 308, 170 A.2d 267, 271 (1961). Those
who own homes in Hickory Township and who sponsored the zoning ordinance in
question will fight to prevent Landowner from using his property for business pur-
poses; the citizenry regards such use as tending to cause the disintegration of its
community.
18 See Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n Zoning Case, 379 Pa. 516, 109 A.2d 537 (1954).
In Corsino v. Grover, supra note 17, the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the
futility of pursuing statutory remedies when the board did not have the power to
grant the landowner any relief. Initial trial court jurisdiction was provided. Accord,
Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 373, 167 N.E.2d
406, 408 (1960).
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Lack of an adequate board remedy would not work such a severe
hardship on Landowner if his statutory appeal could be perfected eco-
nomically and in a short period, so he could quickly obtain a decision by the
common pleas court.' 9 However, the board, responding to an understand-
able desire to avoid a politically embarassing issue, may tend to delay
Landowner to kill his enthusiasm for further appeal, using procedural
pitfalls for this purpose ° What appears a relatively simple process can
result in a seemingly endless period of stall and harassing tactics which
result in loss of money and time.' The costs of statutory appeal fall on
Landowner no matter what the court of common pleas decides.22 In addi-
tion public funds which the board spends to support its position during
the statutory appeal process are wasted if common pleas grants relief. The
problem of inadequate means for protecting the interests of all parties in
such a "taking" situation is clear.
The new Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code 23 should remedy this
situation by permitting initial common pleas jurisdiction in the zoning-
taking cases. The code was intended to cover all condemnations, 24 and
it provides: "If there has been a compensable injury suffered and no
declaration of taking therefor has been filed, a condemnee may file a peti-
tion for the appointment of viewers . ... 2"- Thus the code follows
'9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67007(i) (Supp. 1963); cf. Barth v. Gorson, 383
Pa. 611, 119 A.2d 309 (1956).
20 See note 13 stpra. See generally Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 14, at
273-78; McCarty, Zoning and the Property Rights of Others, 48 MAss. L.Q. 473
(1963) ; Van Dusen & Ryan, Reduction of Zoning Litigation: Proposals, 35 PA.
B.A.Q. 25 (1964) ; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516, 523-29 (1955).
21 Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67007 (Supp. 1963), with Eastman Town-
ship Zoning Cases, supra note 13. The board eventually will hear all of Landowner's
claims, and board experts will present painstakingly prepared reports to rebut Land-
owner's evidence and to demonstrate that the claims are without merit because the
ordinance is well within the meaning of the health, safety, and general welfare require-
ments. See In re Appeal of Nat'l Land & Inv. Co., No. 21, C.P. Chester County,
Pa., Jan. 1963. In the first of this series of cases, in which the land company applied
for a variance, the board held that the township's motion to quash was granted
because the land company had failed to comply with a subdivision ordinance and
therefore had no standing. This decision was appealed to the common pleas court
where the board's decision was reversed, reargument at the insistence of the township
failing to change the result. The board then heard the case on the merits and refused
to grant a variance or to amend the ordinance because it was needed for the health,
safety, and general welfare of the community. This decision was subsequently
reversed by the court of common pleas which held that the zoning ordinance constituted
a taking. Appeal of Nat'l Land & Inv. Co., 13 Chester 4 (C.P. Chester County,
Pa., 1964).
22There is no provision for payment of costs in the zoning process unless gross
negligence, bad faith, or malice can be demonstrated. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 67007 (1957).
23 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §§ 1-101 to -903 (Supp. 1964).
24See EMINENT DOMAIN LAW OF PENNsYLvANIA § 401, comment (Proposed
Code 1963). When the code is taken as a whole, it is clear that the legislative inten-
tion was to include all condemnation cases. Section 1-201(1) states that "'condemn'
means to take, injure or destroy private property by authority of law for a public
purpose." A "condemnee" is defined by §1-201(2) as the "owner of a property interest
taken, injured or destroyed . . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-201 (Supp. 1964).
These definitions are paraphrased from the constitutional provisions dealing with
eminent domain which have been applied to the zoning-taking situation. PA. CONST.
art. XVI, § &
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 1-502(e) (Supp. 1964).
786 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113
previous case law in permitting inverse condemnation actions in regu-
latory-taking cases.28
In addition to the fact that exhaustion of statutory remedies would
be futile, another code provision's requirement that a condemnor pay
damages, including costs and reasonable attorney's fees, when it revokes a
condemnation,27 should permit recognition of this action as an inverse
condemnation suit. This section would apply if the restricted land is con-
sidered as having been taken when the ordinance is passed. It may be
argued that the ordinance should not be viewed as applied to the land
until the landowner has failed to gain relief through the statutory appeal
process, or that invalidation of the ordinance by the court of common pleas
makes the ordinance invalid from the date of passage, and, therefore, the
land was never taken. This argument, however, misses the very real facts
that neither invalidation nor exhaustion of statutory remedies can prevent
or eradicate the injury the landowner has already suffered. 8 Since it is
undeniable that the landowner has suffered injury, the situation comes
within the policy decision made by the legislature when it adopted the
damages provision of the revocation section of the new code. Therefore,
the court of common pleas should treat the ordinance as applied from the
time it went into effect. Granting such damages would not only do justice
to the property owner, but also provide an incentive for the township to
proceed expeditiously in its consideration of objections to zoning ordinances
and requests for variances. Moreover, it would place the risk of uncon-
stitutionality of an ordinance where it belongs-upon the adopting body-
rather than upon the innocent landowner, and thus promote more careful
consideration of such ordinances. Because the zoning board is powerless
to grant relief, and because the court of common pleas would have to take
jurisdiction eventually in order to decide whether there was a taking at
least for purposes of damages pending "revocation," 2 the court should
accept jurisdiction, for the purpose of deciding whether a taking has oc-
curred, without requiring exhaustion of statutory remedies. Such a result
26 See PA. STAT. AN. tit. 26, § 1-612 (Supp. 1964), which provides for damages
for injury to property rights such as that of access even though no property has been
physically taken.
27 The condemnor, by filing a declaration of relinquishment in court within
one year from the filing of the declaration of taking, and before having made
the payment provided for in section 407 (a) or (b), or as to which the con-
demnee has not tendered possession of the condemned property as provided
in section 407, may relinquish all or any part of the property condemned that
it has not taken actual possession of for use in the improvement, whereupon
title shall revest in the condemnee as of the date of the filing of the declara-
tion of taking . . . . Where condemned property is relinquished, the con-
demnee shall be entitled to the damages sustained by him including costs,
expenses and reasonable attorney's fees ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 1-408 (Supp. 1964). (Footnote omitted.)
28 The revocation section of the new code provides that the land whose con-
demnation is being revoked be treated as though it had never been taken. However,
such treatment does not preclude recovery of damages. The code refuses to ignore
the fact that a landowner has suffered damages even though it holds that the title
never left the condemnee. Ibid.
20 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 1-401 (Supp. 1964).
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would be in harmony with the result of the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Corsino v. Grover,30 which apparently recognized that the zoning ordinance
should be considered as applying since passage when relief cannot be
obtained by traditional methods.
The inverse condemnation action would permit the parties to arrive
at a satisfactory settlement concerning the property in question. 31 If
they did not reach a settlement, the court could grant compensation as in
the Sansom Street case,32 or void the ordinance as a violation of the Penn-
sylvania constitution as it did in the case of Miller v. Beaver Falls.33 The
court should give the township the option either to maintain the restrictive
ordinance and pay compensation or to revoke the condemnation and pay
damages. The additional burden placed on the court would be at least
partially offset by the increased opportunity for informal settlement which
follows from recognition of the appropriateness of money damages in this
situation.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PROBLEMS OF "JUST COMPENSATION"
UN]DER THE PENNSYLVANIA EMnENT DOMAIN CODE or 1964
Pennsylvania's newly enacted Eminent Domain Code of 1964 provides
compensation for an expanded range of property interests affected by
condemnation.' Moreover, most of the code seems to implement a policy
of compensation in proportion to the condemnee's actual loss. However,
the framers apparently failed to recognize some problems which arise when
more than one person owns interests in a particular tract. As a result
the code's procedure appears inadequate in such situations, and courts may
fail to take advantage of the means provided to assure truly just compensa-
tion. This comment will treat certain problems in determining the scope
of interests entitled to compensation and in computing damages.
Section 1-601 of the code guarantees "just compensation" to all con-
demnees. 2 A condemnee is defined in section 1-201 as "the owner of a
property interest taken, injured, or destroyed" by the condemnation.m 3 This
definition of persons who are entitled to compensation is somewhat clarified
by section 1-507,4 the procedural section, which requires that all tenants
30 148 Conn. 299, 307-08, 170 A.2d 267, 271 (1961) ; accord, Sinclair Pipe Line
Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 9 Ill. 2d 370, 373, 167 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1960).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 1-501 (Supp. 1964).
32293 Pa. 483, 143 Atl. 134 (1928).
33 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). It should be noted that in a recent law review
article, Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 73 (1964), the Miller
case was referred to as one in which compensation should have been required.
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §§ 1-608 to -610 (Supp. 1964). See generally EMINENT
DomA.iN LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA §§ 609-11 & comments (Proposed Code 1963).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-601 (Supp. *1964).
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §1-201(2) (Supp. 1964).
4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-507 (Supp. 1964).
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and owners of interests in the condemned land have their claims tried to-
gether. It specifically refers to joint tenants, tenants in common, life
tenants, remaindermen, and owners of easements. Since these interests are
specially enumerated, it can be assumed that all holders of such interests
are condemnees. Section 1-507 also refers to "all others having an interest
in the property," a broad class whose membership seems to be left to
judicial interpretation. However, since the statute purports to be the ex-
clusive law, procedure, and remedy for losses resulting from condemnation, 5
the class of "all others having an interest in the property" must include
owners at least of all other interests protected from loss without compensa-
tion under state or federal constitutions.6
A problem of growing importance in defining membership in the class
of interests compensable under the code is whether condemnation of a
property bound by a restrictive covenant entitles co-covenantors to "just
compensation." 7 A majority of American jurisdictions that have passed
on this point have held that such restrictions are part of the aggregate of
rights inhering in property and therefore compensable. 8 A substantial
minority has criticized this approach and has refused to compensate co-
covenantors on the theory that the covenants are mere contracts between
private parties and not applicable to the sovereign.9 Pennsylvania courts
have not decided the point, but a recent supreme court case adopted a broad
view of what constitutes a property interest.1 In affirming an award to
the grantee of a right to mine coal for impairment of his surface facilities
and access, the court endorsed the statement that "property includes prac-
tically all valuable rights, the term being indicative and descriptive of every
possible interest which a person can have, in any and every thing that is
the subject of ownership by man . . . and extending to every species of
valuable right or interest in either real or personal property, or in ease-
5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-303 (Supp. 1964).
I For some interests so protected under the federal constitution, see United States
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (agricultural value of land);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (fixtures and permanent
equipment); United States v. 11.48 Acres of Land, 212 F2d 853 (5th Cir. 1954)
(riparian rights) ; Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (access rights); United States v. Gossler, 60
F. Supp. 971 (D. Ore. 1945) (easement).
Article XVI, § 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution calls for "just compensation for
property taken, injured or destroyed." This language has commonly been construed
to provide a greater range of compensation than do mere "taking" provisions. See
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 111, at 456 (1965). As the court points out in Moyer
v. Commonwealth, 183 Pa. Super. 333, 337, 132 A2d 902, 904 (1957), municipal and
other corporations have been held liable even for consequential damages under the
Pennsylvania constitution, although the Commonwealth was not liable except for
"takings." The new code treats the Commonwealth the same as municipalities.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-612 (Supp. 1964).
For a thorough discussion see 2 NicHoLs, EMiNENT DomAwn § 5.73 (rev. 3d
ed. 1963).
B E.g., Johnstone v. Detroit G., H. & M. Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 222 N.W. 325 (1928);
City of Shelbyville v. Kilpatrick, 204 Tenn. 484, 322 S.W.2d 203 (1959).
0 E.g., State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar, 142 W. Va. 332, 95 S.E2d 457
(1956).
10 Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comnm'n 395 Pa. 441, 149 A.2d 447 (1959).
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ments, franchises and incorporeal hereditaments . . . . " 11 Therefore,
Pennsylvania seems likely to recognize co-covenantors' interests as com-
pensable.
Once it is determined which interests come within the compensa-
tion provisions of the code, it must then be decided how much each
of these interests is worth. Whenever more than one compensable interest
exists in a condemned property, the valuation problem becomes complex,
for section 1-507 adopts the "unit valuation" approach to compensation.
Under this theory the total amount of damages for the condemned prop-
erty is first determined, this amount being computed as if the land were
held in an undivided fee simple.' 2 Thereafter, it is apportioned among
the various condemnees, all of whom are required to bring suit together.
This procedure saves the commonwealth and the parties time and expense '3
and tends to protect the commonwealth from having to pay unwarranted
overlapping recoveries. In some instances, however, the unit approach
may lead to an unjust result discordant with other provisions in the code.
Thus, under unit valuation, the total damages cannot exceed the value of
the condemned land; interests taken whose value is not fully reflected in
the condemned land are not fully compensated for.
An example of the problems arising under this procedure is the
situation of the owner of an easement across the land taken. The ease-
ment's effect on the value of the servient tenement may be only a small
fraction of its value to the dominant tenement.14 If the easement owner
is compensated only for his proportion of the fee value of the servient
tenement, he will receive only the smaller amount, which does not really
reimburse him for his loss. Co-covenantors in a restrictive covenant .in-
cluding the condemned property are in a like predicament.' 5 Such a result
can perhaps be justified on the basis of an argument that the condemnor
should not be required to pay for more than it is gaining: since it is
acquiring only a fee simple in the land, it should have to pay only the
value of a fee simple, without having to worry about the ornate structure
of interests which individuals have erected upon it. Yet this solution
not only seems unjust to persons like the easement owner, but also con-
travenes the explicit command of another section of the code, which pro-
vides that each condemnee is entitled to "just compensation," an amount
defined as "the difference between the fair market value of the condemnee's
entire property interest immediately before the condemnation . . . and
1I1d. at 453, 149 A.2d at 453 (quoting 73 C.J.S. Property §1(b), at 1384b
(1955)).
12 See generally 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
§109 (2d ed. 1953).
13 Orgel suggests that administrative convenience is an important factor in the
continued vitality of the "unit" rule. Ibid.
14 The United States Supreme .Court stated expressly in United States v. Welch,
217 U.S. 333, 339 (1909), that "the valuation of an easement cannot be ascertained
without reference to the dominant estate to which it was attached." - "
15 See text accompanying notes -7-11 supra for a description of the situatiop-regard-
ing restrictive covenants.
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the fair market value of his property interest remaining immediately after
such condemnation . . . and such other damages as are provided in this
article." 16 This section seems to contemplate the condemnee receiving
payment for the entire loss in value of his own property interest, regardless
of the position of other condemnees who may have interests in the same
piece of land. This interpretation of the code as contemplating full reim-
bursement to each condemnee for all his pecuniary loss 17 is supported by
the inclusion within the definition of "just compensation" of traditionally
excluded special damages such as removal expenses,' 8 business dislocation
damages, 9 and moving expenses 0
This conflict between provisions of the code indicates that the framers
and the legislature failed to discern these problems. Nevertheless, they
have included a section which can be used to resolve the conflict and provide
a just recovery. Section 1-605 provides that "where all or a part of several
contiguous tracts owned by one owner is condemned or a part of several
non-contiguous tracts owned by one owner which are used together for a
unified purpose is condemned, damages shall be assessed as if such tracts
were one parcel." 2 1 Unfortunately, the code carries no direct definition
of the word "owner." But the meaning can be derived, perhaps, from the
language of section 1-507, which describes "owners of easements, and all
others having an interest in the property" as "owners" thereof. Thus, it
would seem that damage to properties connected with the condemned tract
through a restrictive covenant or easement should be included in the "total
amount of damages." Section 1-606 ensures that these damages will be
enough to provide adequate compensation. It states that:
16 PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 26, § 1-602 (Supp. 1964). The former Pennsylvania rule
measured compensation by "the difference between the market value of the land be-
fore . . . and its market value immediately after the appropriation . . . ." Brown
v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 156, 158, 159 A.2d 881, 882 (1960) ; accord, Peterson v.
Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority, 383 Pa. 383, 119 A.2d 79 (1955) ; Spiwak v.
Allegheny County, 366 Pa. 145, 77 A.2d 97 (1950). The change from "market value
of the land" to "market value of the condemnee's entire property interest" may signal
an important philosophical change in the law.
17 Recovery for such damages as removal expenses, loss of business good will,
and general moving expenses has been cited as a recent trend toward compensating the
owner for what he has lost. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Con-
cept, 42 CALMn L. Rav. 596, 615-20 (1954). As far back as 1910, in Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910), the Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, had announced that in condemnation cases "the question is
what the owner lost, not what the taker gained." Id. at 195. But it is only recently that
this concept has begun to have any real vitality. See, e.g., Spies & McCoid, Recovery
of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REv. 437 (1962) ; Comment,
Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE
L.J. 61 (1957). Paying for the property interest taken may be beneficial to the con-
demnor in certain cases. In Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, supra,
dual interests actually depressed one another in value, and the condemnor had to pay
only for the loss occasioned to each interest holder, thus saving $55,000.
18 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 26, § 1-608 (Supp. 1964).
19 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-609 (Supp. 1964).
2 0 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-610 (Supp. 1964).
21 PA. STAT. AN. tit 26, § 1-605 (Supp. 1964).
LEGISLATION
In determining the fair market value of the remaining property
after a partial taking, consideration shall be given to the use to
which the property condemned is to be put and the damages or
benefits specially affecting the remaining property due to its
proximity to the improvement for which the property was taken.
22
While "owner" probably need not be read to carry the same meaning in
sections 1-507 and 1-605 and thereby lead to this result, this reading is
desirable in order to carry out the spirit of the code: to give property
owners compensation equal to their actual losses. If this reading is rejected,
the objectives of the code can and should be carried out by considering
the dominant tenement as a separate property which has been partially
condemned and holding separate hearings to assess the damage to it.
Neither this approach nor section 1-605, however, completely elim-
inates the inequities resulting from the "unit" procedure. In the landlord
and tenant area the competitive nature of the struggle over apportionment
is acute, particularly because it has been recognized that leases are not
normally bought and sold, and, consequently, that market value is an un-
satisfactory test in determining the value of a leasehold.P The tenant
whose rent is less than the rent for similar leaseholds on the open market
receives the difference between the two figures. This value-which may
not be reflected in the value of the land-is then deducted from the total
award, the residue going to the landlord 2 4  Landlords, fearful of this
struggle, have tended to insert condemnation clauses in modern leases,
requiring that the lease terminate as of the date of the condemnation with
all rights vesting in the landlord.2 5 The tenant thus suffers hardship
because of the uncompensated loss of his true right in the property, i.e.,
an uninterrupted use of the leasehold. 26
It is possible, however, that the injustice of unit valuation may be
more theoretical than actual, for article VII of the code seems to authorize
admission of a wide range of evidence in condemnation proceedings. If
the condemnee can present to a jury or board of viewers evidence of the
22 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 1-606 (Supp. 1964).
2 3 See James McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W.R.R., 216 Pa. 504,
511, 65 AtI. 1091, 1094 (1907).
24 The leasehold problem is discussed in Snitzer, Slicing the Condemnation Pie:
Compensable Interest Under Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania, 9 VIL.. L. REv. 250,
254-59 (1964). See generally 1 ORGEL, op. Cit. supra note 12, §§ 120-27.
25 See Snitzer, supra note 24, at 258.
26 This right was clearly recognized in James McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh,
C. & W.R.R., 216 Pa. 504, 511, 65 At. 1091, 1094 (1907), where the court said:
"The right of which he [the tenant] is deprived and for which he is entitled to full
compensation is the right to remain in undisturbed possession to the end of the term."
For a general criticism of the "unit!' approach in the landlord and tenant situ-
ation, see Hitchings, The Valuation of Leasehold Interests and Some Elements of
Damage Thereto, 1960 INSTITUTE OF EMINENT DOMAIN PRoCEImGS 61. Mayor of
Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 61 Atl. 203 (1905), is an oft-cited case in which
the court refused to use the "unit" approach, suggesting it might be unconstitutional
as applied to a tenant who held a ninty-nine year ground rent. Id. at 631-32, 61
Atl. at 206.
792 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113
value of his discrete interest "prior to the determination of the undivided
fee value, not infrequently [he can lead] . . the tribunal to estimate
compensation with an eye to the subsequent apportionment." 27 Unfor-
tunately, the code fails to make clear whether the owner of each discrete
interest has this protection, which can only be described as a loophole if
unit valuation is otherwise strictly enforced. Nevertheless, the breadth and
liberality of the provisions of article VII would appear to preclude limi-
ting evidence to that which relates to the property as a whole.?8 Section
1-701 permits the board of viewers to receive all data "without being bound
by the formal rules of evidence." - Both before and at trial the condemnee,
"without further qualification, may testify as to just compensation." 30
Finally, experts are clearly not limited in the data they may use in reaching
their valuation conclusions, so it would seem quite proper for them, at
least, to allude to the individual property interest.
Although the evil effects of the unit valuation procedure may thus be
circumvented in various ways in order to award "just compensation" to
condemnees, other states contemplating the adoption of new eminent domain
codes should refuse to adopt this outmoded approach 31 and should seek
instead to secure for each individual his right to receive compensation in
proportion to his individual loss.
2 1 ORGE, Op. cit. supra note 12, § 112.
28The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Continuing Legal Education
published a pamphlet to help guide practitioners through the important parts of the
new code. In its introductory statements concerning article VII, it was stated that:
The purpose of this article of the law is to significantly change the present
case-made rules of evidence in eminent domain cases, which have tended to
be so restrictive as to prevent adequate consideration of those evidential
matters which fairly bear on an appraisal of the fair market value of a con-
demnee's interest in a condemned property.
OLns, TxE PENNSYLVANiA ExINENT DOMAIN CODE OF 1964, at 27 (1964).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-701 (Supp. 1964).
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-704 (Supp. 1964).
31 See Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Inci-
dental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 70 (1957), for a thorough discussion of this idea in
its broad context
